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RECENT DECISIONS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT USURPATION
OF PoucE PowER oF STATES CoNsTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS -

Defendants were indicted for violating section l l of the National Firearms
Act 1 by transporting a .firearm in interstate commerce without having registered it, and without having in their possession a stamp-affixed written order
for the firearm. Their demurrer alleged that the act was unconstitutional because it was not a revenue measure but an attempt to usurp police power reserved
to the states, and because it infringed the constitutional right to bear arms. The
district court sustained the demurrer on the ground that this section of the
act violated the constitutional right to bear arms. Held, on appeal, that the
National Firearms Act does not usurp police power reserved to the states nor
infringe the constitutional right to bear arms. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 59 S. Ct. 816 (1939).
Congress has no general police power.2 Therefore, it strikes at crime
indirectly through enforcement of laws based upon its delegated powers. The
National Firearms Act is an attempt by Congress through its taxing power to
regulate the traffic in criminal weapons such as sub-machine guns and sawed-off
shotguns. This act was preceded by the Harrison Narcotic. Drug Act,3 which
used this same power to suppress the illegal drug traffic. Its revenue provisions
were enforced by stringent regulation of the production and transfer of opium
or its derivatives. The Court upheld this as a constitutional use of the power
to tax which did not usurp the police power of the states."' The National Firearms Act is patterned 5 after the Harrison Act, and in similar manner its regulatory features are substantially related to enforcement of its revenue measures.
It also has the psychological advantage of regulating a thing malum in se, as
contrasted with the abortive attempt to regulate legitimate business
through the taxing power in order to prevent child labor. 6 Therefore,
the Court might well hold that it purports on its face to be a taxing measure
and will not be declared otherwise because it has a regulatory effect and tends
to restrict or suppress the thing taxed.7 In Sonzinsky v. United States,8 the
Court upheld section 2, which requires, the registration of all dealers, manufacturers, and importers of firearms a..,d levies an annual tax of from $200 to $500
on each. But in so doing, it declared that section 2 embodied no offensive regulations and was productive of some revenue. This left uncertainty as to whether
the Court would be willing to find that sections 3 and 4 purported to be taxing
measures. Section 3 places a tax of $200 on each transfer of a firearm and is
certainly more prohibitive. . Section 4 is even more regulatory in forbidding
48 Stat. L. 1236 (1934), 26 U.S. C. (1934), §§ u32-u32q.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); 12 C. J. 910 (1917).
8
38 Stat. L. 785 (1914), 44 Stat. L. 97 (1926), 26 U.S. C. (1934), § 1040.
"'United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 S. Ct. 214 (1919); Linder v.
United States, 268 U.S. 5, 45 S. Ct. 446, 39 A. L. R. 229 (1925); Nigro v. United
States, 276 U. S. 332, 48 S. Ct. 388 (1928).
5 United States v. Adams, (D. C. Fla. 1935) l l F. Supp. 216.
6
Bailey v. Drexel Furnitui:e Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449 (1922).
7
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 533 (1869); McCray v. United
States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769 (1904).
11
300 u. s. 506, 57 s. Ct. 554 (1937).
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transfer of a firearm except in pursuance of a written order from the purchaser
filled out upon a special form to be issued. Furthermore, if the applicant is an
individual, he must forward his fingerprints and his photograph for identification, and any purchaser who accepts transfer of a .firearm without obtaining
possession of the required stamp-affixed written order violates the law. The
question before the Court in the principal case was whether the demurrer was
properly sustained over the objection that the act infringes the right to bear arms.
_But in its opening sentence the Court denounced as untenable the demurrer's
other objection that the act usurps police power reserved to the states. In support
of this were cited Sonz.insky 'll. United States and the Harrison Act with the
various cases upholding it. Such a voluntary assertion seems a rather broad and
summary disposition of this objection to the act. However, it removes the reason
for its being invalid as a revenue measure and would seem to establish sections
3 and 4 as valid taxing provisions. The Court, in assuming that the constitutional right to bear arms includes .firearms, had little difficulty in .finding that
the act does not infringe this right. The Constitution guarantees this right as
a necessity to the existence of a well regulated militia 9 and it should be construed
accordingly. During colonial times the weapons of the citizens provided an
arsenal for the local militia. Today the state supplies the weapons and this
necessity for the citizen bearing arms no longer exists. Therefore, the right is
subject to such reasonable limitations as the National Firearms Act imposes,
Moreover, the Court decided that the constitutional right to bear arms does not
include a sawed-off shotgun, since it is not a necessary piece of equipment to
the member of a well regulated militia. This same reasoning would aptly apply
to the sub-machine gun used by criminals.

9 U. S. Const., Amend. II: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed."

